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ALL ABOARD THE BRUTON NE
Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTON
In Gray v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the in-
troduction, at ajoint trial, of a codefendant's incriminating con-
fession violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation, even though the confession was redacted to re-
place the defendant's name with neutral, non-identifying terms
such as "deleted."2 Such a redaction was considered to be of the
same legal consequence as the original confession. The Su-
preme Court found that the blank spaces and words "deleted"
or "deletion" were facially incriminating and simply invited the
jury to fill in the blanks.4
This Note argues that the majority's rule for determining
the admissibility of a codefendant's incriminating confession
was correct. The majority's rule permits the justice system to
strive for, and achieve, competing goals.
Next, this Note argues that the majority and dissent, in fact,
agreed on the appropriate approach to determining the admis-
sibility of redacted confessions. Both the dissent and majority
employed a facially incriminating analysis.5 Where the majority
and dissent divided camps, however, is whether or not the con-
fession in Gray v. Maryland was admissible under that approach.6
The majority was correct in holding that the redacted confes-
sion in Gray v. Maryland was inadmissible under the facially in-
criminating analysis because the jury was compelled to link the
'118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
2 Id. at 1155.
3 Id. at 1156.
4 Id. at 1155.
'Id. at 1157.
6 Id. at 1151.
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confession to the codefendant, which violated Gray's Sixth
Amendment constitutional guarantees.
II. BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause commands that "[I] n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. 7 The Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, s includes the right of cross-
examination.9
In early cases examining the Confrontation Clause, the
Court held that it was "reasonably possible for the jury to follow
sufficiently clear instructions" to disregard a confessor's in-
criminatory statement against his codefendant. 0 In Delli Paoli v.
United States, for example, five men were convicted of conspiring
to "possess and transport alcohol in unstamped containers and
to evade payment of federal taxes on the alcohol." Codefen-
dant Whitley did not testify at trial, but confessed to the crime
in an out-of-court statement, which specifically implicated all
four codefendants. Whitley's confession was introduced into
7 U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The WindingPath ofBruton v.
United States: A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 401, 403-5 (1998)
(detailing the history of the Confrontation Clause); Williams S. Pittman, Note, Barker
v. Morris and the Right? to Confrontation, 14 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 839, 844 (1987)
(explaining the origin of the Confrontation Clause).
'Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
9 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit succinctly explained the object of the Confrontation
Clause as follows:
The primary object... [is] to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an oppor-
tunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief.
Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1986).
'0 Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
" Id. at 233.
12 id.
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evidence in its entirety, along with limiting jury instructions. 3
Only codefendant Orlando Delli Paoli appealed his conviction
based on the introduction of Whitley's unredacted statement
into evidence. 14 The Court found that limiting jury instructions
can adequately safeguard a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation, even where a codefendant's incriminating
confession is introduced in whole form.'5 The Court reasoned
that if the jury truly disregarded the "reference to the codefen-
dant, no question would arise under the Confrontation Clause,
because by hypothesis the case [would be] treated as if the con-
fessor made no statement inculpating the nonconfessor."6 The
key principle in Delli Paoli was that "unless we proceed on the
basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where
those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such that
the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury sys-
tem makes little sense.' 7
The Court next addressed a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation in Jackson v. Denno.Y The Jackson Court
examined a New York State procedure for determining whether
" Id. The jury was instructed that Whitley's statement "will be considered by you
solely in connection with your determination of the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant Whitley. It is not to be considered as proof in connection with the guilt or inno-
cence of any of the other defendants." Id. at 239-40.
"4 Id. at 233. Pertinent parts of Whitley's unredacted confession implicating Or-
lando Delli Paoli read as follows:
Just before Carl went to jail in 1950, he introduced me to Bobby. I have been
shown a photograph bearing ATU 3643 N.Y. dated 12/29/51 of Orlando Delli Paoli,
and I identify it as that of the man known to me as Bobby. This was sometime in the
summer of 1951. Bobby would come to my house to see me. If I placed an order with
him he would set the date and the time for seven or eight o'clock in the evening when I
was to pick up the alcohol.
My purchases from Bobby would consist of two or three 5-gallon cans of alcohol at
a time and were made once or twice a week. The last two times I paid Bobby $38 a can.
Id. at 245-46.
" Id. The Court did comment that "there may be practical limitations to the cir-
cumstances under which ajury should be left to follow instructions but this case does
not present them." Id. at 243.
16 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
'7 Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 242.
"378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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a confession was made voluntarily.19 The Court concluded that
a defendant in a criminal case cannot be convicted based upon,
in whole or in part, an involuntary confession, regardless of
whether the statement is true or false, or whether other evi-
dence supports the conviction.' °
The New York State procedure allowed the trial judge to ex-
clude a confession if it was clearly made involuntarily.2'
Whether the confession was made voluntarily became a jury
question, however, in situations where it could be reasonably
disputed . This procedure posed a significant danger in in-
stances where a confession, albeit true, was found to have been
made involuntarily, raising the question whether ajury would be
able to disregard this real and incriminating information when
determining a defendant's guilt.2' The Court ultimately agreed
that a jury, when deciding a confessor's guilt, could not be de-
pended upon to ignore her confession of guilt should it find the
24 ticonfession involuntary. For this reason, the Court concluded
that the trial judge, and not the jury, must decide whether a
confession was given voluntarily.s
Eleven years later, Bruton v. United States expressly overruled
Delli Paoli.26 The Bruton Court relied on the rationale in Jackson
to overrule Delli Paoli, even though the facts in Jackson were not
'9 Id. at 377.
2Id.
21 id.
Id. Thejurors' task, embodied in the jury instructions inJackson, read as follows:
Should you decide under the rules that I gave you that [the confession] is voluntary,
true and accurate, you may use it, and give it the weight you feel that you should give it.
If you decide that it is involuntary, exclude it from the case. Do not consider it at all. In
that event, you must go to the other evidence in the case to see whether or not the guilt
of Jackson was established to your satisfaction outside of the confession, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
Id. at 375 n.5.
Id. at 382. The Court explained that the jury may not understand the policy rea-
sons behind excluding from evidence a true, but involuntary, confession. Id.
21 Id. at 389.
2Id. at 391. The Court further stated that "whether the trial judge, another judge,
or anotherjury, but not the convicting jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is not
a matter of concern here." Id. at 391 n.19 (emphasis added).
26 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
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directly analogous to the facts in Delli Paoli.17 The basic premise
of Jackson, according to Bruton, altogether repudiated the sup-
position behind Delli Paoli.
28
In Bruton, codefendant Evans' out-of-court oral confessions
to a postal inspector were introduced into evidence at his joint
trial for postal armed robbery with petitioner George Williams
Bruton.2 The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction
prior to the introduction of the confession and cautioned the
jury at the close of the Government's direct case as well.0 Evans
and Bruton were both found guilty of armed postal robbery by
the jury.3' Bruton's conviction was affirmed on appeal, even
though Evans' confession directly incriminated him, solely be-
cause the jury had been given a limiting instruction.32 The Su-
preme Court, however, overturned Bruton's conviction due to
the substantial risk that the jury had, indeed, considered Evans'
confessions in determining Bruton's guilt.3 3 The Court believed
that "there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will
not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the conse-
quence of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. 34
The Court still acknowledged the reliability of the jury system in
most circumstances.3 5 The Court thus created the Bruton prin-




Id. at 126 n.2. The judge explained that Evans' confession implicating Bruton "if
used, can only be used against the defendant Evans. It is hearsay insofar as the de-
fendant George Williams Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it in any
respect to the defendant Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay." Id.
" Id. at 124.
12 Id. at 125. Interestingly, Evans' conviction was overturned on appeal on the basis
that his oral confessions to a postal inspector should not have been admitted into evi-
dence against him. Id. The oral confessions had been prompted by an earlier un-
constitutional police investigation in which Evans did not have counsel and was not
given preliminary warnings of any kind. Id.
'Id. at 126.




in this specific context have virtually the same effect as if no in-
structions had been given at all.
6
Justice White37 dissented in Bruton from what he labeled as
"an excessively rigid rule."8 Justice White argued that the con-
fession in Jackson was entirely distinct from the confession in
Bruton and thereby raised extremely different questions of
credibility and jury reliability.39 The confession in Jackson came
from the defendant himself, "the most knowledgeable and un-
impeachable source of information about his past conduct.,
40
Thus it was no wonder that it might have been difficult, if not
impossible, for the jury to disregard the statement in determin-
ing the defendant's guilt, especially if the statement was true.'
The jury may not have fully understood the policy behind fore-
going truthful, incriminating evidence in order to preserve
other constitutional guarantees.
In contrast to the majority, Justice White noted that the
confession in Bruton was made by Evans, Bruton's codefendant.
43
This, explained Justice White, raised a real issue of credibility.44
A confessor's statements are less trustworthy than other hearsay
-evidence, according to Justice White, because he is tainted by
the strong motivation to inculpate his codefendant and thereby
absolve himself of all or any of the blame.45 Justice White be-
lieved that a jury, with a proper limiting instruction, would be
able to recognize and understand the need to ignore this cate-
gory of particularly suspect hearsay. 6
m Id. See also Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.,
analogizing a limiting instruction to a mere placebo or "recommendation to the jury
of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else's").
"'Justice Harlanjoined injustice White's dissenting opinion.
3Id. at 139 (White,j., dissenting).
"Id. at 139-40 (White,J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 140 (WhiteJ., dissenting).
4, Id. (White,J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 141 (White,J., dissenting).
431 Id. (White,J., dissenting).
"Id. (White,J., dissenting).
4' Id. at 141-42 (White, J., dissenting). "Whereas the defendant's own confession
possesses greater reliability and evidentiary value than ordinary hearsay, the codefen-
dant's confession implicating the defendant is intrinsically much less reliable." Id.
46 Id. at 142 (White,j., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice White's dissent in Bruton briefly addressed
the future use of a redacted codefendant's confession, a topic
not discussed by the majority.47 The dissent's only guidance on
this issue was that a redacted confession must not change the
statement so as to unduly prejudice either the confessor or the
Government.
48
The dissent's thought proved to be directly on target as the
next stop on the Bruton line was an examination of the intro-
duction of a codefendant's redacted confession. In Richardson
v. Marsh, respondent Clarrisa Marsh, Benjamin Williams and
Kareem Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton
and murdering her son and aunt.49 Marsh and Williams were
tried together despite Marsh's objection.50 Williams did not tes-
tify at trial, but a confession given to the police after his arrest
was admitted into evidence.5 1 That confession detailed a con-
versation between Williams and Martin in the car on the way to
the robbery and corroborated the events in Knighton's testi-52
mony. The confession, however, was redacted so as to com-
pletely eliminate all reference to Marsh.5 ' Additionally, the jury
was cautioned only to use the confession against Williams.
5 4
At the trial, Marsh testified that she had been in the back
seat of the car with Martin and Williams, but said that she could
not hear the conversation because the radio was too loud.
55
Marsh admitted entering the Knighton home but stated that she
had not intended to rob or kill anyone and did not have prior
knowledge of Martin's and Williams' plan. 6 During his closing
argument, the prosecutor linked Marsh to part of William's con-
17 Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also voiced their concerns that the
ruling in Bruton would hinder the occurrence of joint trials, which are more eco-
nomical and efficient and promote consistency in judgments and sentencing. Id.
Id. (White,J, dissenting).
4 481 U.S. 200, 202 (1987).
50 Id. Martin was unavailable for trial as he was a fugitive at that time. Id. Marsh's
motion to sever her trial from Williams was denied. Id.
" Id. at 203-04.
1







fession, when he stated "if [Marsh] admits that she heard the
conversation and she admits to the plan, she's guilty of at least
armed robbery."
5 7
The jury found Marsh guilty of one count of assault with in-
tent to commit murder and two counts of felony murder in the
perpetration of an armed robbery.58 The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal and Marsh's motion for reconsideration. 59 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
her conviction based on an "evidentiary linkage" or "contextual
implication" approach.6° The Sixth Circuit contended that in
the context of all admissible evidence at trial, the account of the
conversation in the confession was "powerfully incriminating to
Marsh with respect to the critical element of intent.,
61
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
determined that William's statement, which was redacted so as
to exclude any reference to Marsh, did not violate Marsh's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation, even though extrinsic evi-
dence at trial linked her to the confession. 2 The Court charac-
terized Bruton as a narrow exception to the premise that juries. . ... 63
follow limiting instructions. It likened the Bruton principle to a
facially incriminating analysis, where a confessor's statement is
'17 d. at 205 n.2.
8 Id. at 205.
" Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1204 (6th Cir. 1986). Marsh then filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that her Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was violated by the introduction of William's confession into evidence.
Id. at 1205. Marsh also asserted that she was "denied due process by denial of her
motion for directed verdict when the evidence was insufficient for conviction." Id.
The district court denied Marsh's petition. Id. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit soon after "granted a certificate of probable cause and appointed
counsel." Id.
o Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206. To explain further, "the Sixth Circuit resolved that
the inculpatory value of a co-defendant's extra-judicial statement was to be measured
not solely by the four comers of the statement, but also by reference to other evi-
dence admitted in the trial." Judith L. Ritter, The X Files: Joint Trials, Redacted Confes-
sions and Thirty Years of SidesteppingBruton, 42 VIL. L. REv. 855, 879-80 (1997).
61 Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1213.




inadmissible only if it expressly inculpates one's codefendant.64
The Richardson court believed that the redacted version of a co-
defendant's confession yielded an inference that the jurors were
able to look past when determining the defendant's guilt.6 The
Court thus rejected a contextual analysis approach and ex-
plained that the question was not whether the confession in-
criminated Marsh but whether it was correct to assume that the
jury did not use it against Marsh.6 Since the confession was not
incriminating on its face, as the confession was in Bruton, it was
appropriate to assume that the jury did not improperly use the
67confession.
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the Bruton princi-
ple encompassed both a contextual analysis approach and a fa-
cially incriminating approach and therefore applied "without
exception to all inadmissible confessions that are powerfully in-
criminating. "68 Justice Stevens characterized the majority's dif-
ferentiation between a confession that names a defendant and
one that does not as illogical because the latter can be just as
devastating or powerfully incriminating to a defendant as the
former when linked with other evidence at trial.69 Justice Stev-
ens contended that the proper test for admitting a codefen-
dant's confession should not be based solely on whether the
defendant is specifically named in the confession; instead, a
court should look at each confession on a case-by-case basis and
assess whether it was powerfully incriminating or not.70 In this
particular instance, Justice Stevens stated that the confession
Id. at 208. The Supreme Court reasoned that "specific testimony that 'the de-
fendant helped me commit the crime' is more vivid than inferential incrimination,
and hence more difficult to thrust out of the mind." Id. at 208.
6'Id. The Court concluded that "in short, while it may not always be simple for the
members of ajury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating infer-
ence, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that
is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the general rule." Id. at 208.
6 rd.
6
7 Id. at 208-09.
68 Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 211.
Id. at 212 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
71 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
1999] 845
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became facially incriminating when linked with the other evi-
dence at trial and thus should not have been admitted at trial.
71
None of the Supreme Court's prior cases addressed the
question of "the admissibility of a confession in which the de-
fendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral
pronoun."72 Gray v. Maryland addressed this final stop on the
Bruton line.73
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stacey Williams was beaten to death on November 10,
1993.74 After a preliminary investigation, the police arrested An-
thony Bell for the murder!" Bell gave a written statement to the
Baltimore police in which he specifically implicated himself,
Jacquin Vanlandingham ("Tank"), and petitioner Kevin Do-
monic Gray.76 Bell also stated that "several other guys" were in-
volved in the beating of Stacey Williams.77  Gray was
subsequently arrested for the beating and gave an "exculpatory
oral statement to the police.7 8 Tank was subsequently unavail-
able for trial because he was mortally wounded in an unrelated
incident two days after William's death.
Gray and Bell were tried jointly s° The Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City denied Gray's motion to sever his trial from Bell's
71 Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This confession was of critical importance because it was the only evidence directly link-
ing respondent with the specific intent, expressed before the robbery, to kill the victims
afterwards. If Williams had taken the witness stand... [he] could have [been] cross-
examined to challenge his credibility and to establish... [the volume of the car radio].
Id. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 211 n.5.
" See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
7 4 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Re-
spondent at 1, Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998) (No. 96-8653).
75Id.
76 Petitioner's Brief at 2, Gray (No. 96-8653).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Gray
(No. 96-8653).
Petitioner's Brief at 2, Gray (No. 96-8653). Gray told the police that he was
speaking to his girlfriend on a public phone at the time of the beating. Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 2.
80 Id. at 2-3.
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trial and, alternatively, his motion to exclude Bell's incriminat-
ing confession.8' The trial court believed that Bell's confession
"[could] be sanitized in about three different spots so as to re-
move the names of Tank and Mr. Gray .... ,82 The trial court
believed that such measures would ensure that the jury would
not be "left with the unavoidable inference or implication that
the person Mr. Bell is referring to in the statement is Mr.
Gray."83 The trial court further found that "where you've got
group activity and the evidence here is, apparently, going to be
that there were at least five, and maybe as many as six men in-
volved in the assault on the victim, to redact this statement...
will not unduly prejudice Mr. Gray.
8 4
Bell did not testify at trial; instead, Detective Homer Pen-
nington read his confession to the jury.5 Detective Pennington
8' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Gray
(No. 96-8653).




Petitioner's Brief at 3, Gray (No. 96-8653). The pertinent part of the trial tran-
script reads as follows:
Question, what can you tell me about the beating of Stacey Williams that occurred
on 10, November, 1993?
Answer, an argument broke out between deletion and Stacey in the 500 block of
Louden Avenue. Stacey got smacked and then ran into Wildwood Parkway. Me, de-
leted, and a few other guys ran after Stacey. We caught up to him on Wildwood Park-
way. We beat Stacey up. After we beat Stacey up, we walked him back to Louden
Avenue. I then walked over and used the phone, Stacey and the others walked down
Louden.
Question, when Stacey was beaten on Wildwood Parkway, how was he beaten?
Answer, hit, kicked.
Question, who hit and kicked Stacey?
Answer, I hit Stacey. He was kicked but I don't know who kicked him.
Question, who was in the group that beat Stacey?
Answer, me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys.
Question, do you know the other guy's name?
Answer, deleted, deleted and me. I don't remember who was out there.
Question, did anyone pick Stacey up and drop him to the ground?
Answer, no, when I was there.
Question, what was the argument over between Stacey and deleted?
Answer, some money that Stacey owed deleted.
Question, how many guys were hitting on Stacey?
Answer, about six guys.
Question, do you have a blackjacket with Park Heights written on the back?
Answer, yes.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 89
used the words "deleted" or "deletion" in lieu of the names of
Gray and Tank.86 Written copies of the confession were admit-
ted into evidence as well.87 Those copies used blank white
spaces set apart by commas in place of the names of Gray and
Tank.e Additionally, before the confession was introduced into
evidence, the judge specifically instructed the jury to use the
confession only against Bell and not to use the confession in any
way against Gray. 9
After Detective Pennington read Bell's confession into evi-
dence, however, the prosecution asked him whether "after
[Bell] gave you that information, you subsequently were able to
arrest Mr. Kevin Gray?"9 The Detective responded that he was
able to arrest Gray based upon the information in the confes-
sion.9'
Question, who else has these jackets?
Answer, deletion.
Question, after reading this statement, would you sign it?
Answer, yes.
Id. at 3-4.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Gray
(No. 96-8653).
587 id
Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1115, 1153 (1998).
"Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Gray
(No. 96-8653). Thejury instructions read as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you're about to hear evidence concerning the
statement provided by Mr. Bell when he was interviewed by the detective. You should
understand, and I will remind you later, that this evidence concerning the statement
provided by Mr. Bell is to be considered by you as evidence against Mr. Bell only and in no
way is Mr. Bell's statement provided to the detective about which he's about to testify to
be considered by you as evidence against Mr. Gray. It is evidence against Mr. Bell only, and
as I will instruct you later, you will consider the evidence against each of the defendants indi-
vidually and reach a separate verdict as to each defendant.
Petitioner's Brief at 3, Gray (No. 96-8653) (emphasis added).
go Id. at 5. See also Gray v. Maryland 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1161 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Interestingly, the defense did not object to this "follow-up" question at trial.
This "failure to object deprive[d] petitioner of the right to complain of some incre-
mental identifiability added to the redacted statement by the question and answer."
Id.
91 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Gray (No. 96-8653). The prosecution questioned the De-
tective as follows:
REDACTING CONFESSIONS
In addition to the redacted confession, two witnesses testi-
fied against Gray at the trial.92 Tracy Brumfield stated that she
saw Gray, Tank, and ten other young men chase Stacey Williams
down the street.93 Shay Yarberough actually identified Gray as a
participant in the fatal beating of Stacey Williams.94 Yarberough
testified that Gray, Bell, Tank, and three other men approached
Stacey Williams and asked him "'where their money at."' 95 Tank
then hit Williams in the mouth, kicked him several times and
dropped him on his head three times.96 According to the testi-
mony, although Gray could not lift Williams completely into the
air, Gray managed to drop him on his head as well. Yarber-
ough further testified that Gray, Bell, Tank, and three others
kicked Stacey Williams in the head and body repeatedly.98 On
cross-examination, however, Gray's attorney impeached Yarber-
ough by introducing an earlier statement to the police in which
Yarberough said that he had seen the beating but could not
identify the participants.?
Gray denied beating Williams in both his statements to the
police and at trial. 0° Gray testified that he was on a public
phone speaking with his girlfriend, Chanel Brown, during the
beating. 0' Three witnesses confirmed Gray's story.0 2 Chanel
Brown testified that Gray had called her from a public phone
Q, All right, now officer, after he gave you that information, you subsequently were








97 Id. Yarberough also stated, in accordance with Bell's confession, that the partici-
pants in the beating wore jackets that said "Park Heights." Id.
9' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Gray
(No. 96-8653).
Gray v. Maryland, 667 A.2d 983, 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
"'Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Gray
(No. 96-8653).




and told her that Tank was fighting up the street.103 Renardo
Bell and Lamont Mathews testified that they did not see Gray in
the group beating Stacey Williams.0 Further, Mathews stated
that he saw Gray at a phone booth half a block away from the
incident. '0 5
Gray was convicted of involuntary manslaughter by the jury
for the death of Stacey Williams. 06 The judge sentenced him to
ten years imprisonment with all but seven years suspended.
0 7
Gray appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland.108 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
reversed Gray's conviction, holding that the introduction of
Bell's inculpatory confession, although redacted to exclude
Gray's name by using the words "deleted" or "deletion," violated
Gray's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, despite any limiting instructions. 1°9 The court
placed this case at "a point on the continuum between Bruton
and Richardson," and explicitly adopted the contextual analysis
approach."0 The court explained that "in order to determine
whether a substantial risk exists, the trial court must consider
the degree of inference the jury must make to connect the de-
fendant to the statement and the degree of risk that the jury will
make that linkage despite a limiting instruction.""' Further,
that determination must be made in the context of all other
evidence at trial.12 Using a "substantial risk" criterion, the court
found that "the jury need only have taken a short step in infer-
ring" that Gray participated in the beating.13 It deemed Bell's
'' Id. at 985.
'o Id. at 984.
105 Id.




108 Gray, 667 A.2d at 983.
'0' Id. at 985.
"' Id. at 990.
. Id. at 988.
11 Id.
13 Id. at 990.
850 [Vol. 89
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confession "facially incriminating and constitutionally violative,"
and therefore reversed Gray's conviction."'
The State of Maryland subsequently appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland."5 The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
jected the contextual analysis approach adopted by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland. It stated that simply because
"the jury could have reasonably connected Gray to Bell's confes-
sion is not sufficient to raise a Bruton challenge."' 7 Rather, the
court determined that "a Bruton violation occurs when a code-
fendant's confession, either facially or by compelling and inevi-
table inference, inculpates a nonconfessing defendant.""' 8 The
court's reasoning thus lay in between the "contextual analysis"
and "facially incriminating" approaches." 9 The court explained
that "'unless [tihe compulsion to make the impermissible infer-
ence [is] compelling, inevitable, and subject to little or no de-
bate[,] . . . the general and strong presumption that jurors
follow their instructions is not overcome, and the requirements
of Bruton are therefore satisfied.", 20  Emphasizing that at least
six other individuals participated in the beating, the court
found that the jury was not compelled to abandon the judge's
limiting instructions and infer that Bell's confession implicated
114 Id.
"' State v. Gray, 687 A.2d 660 (Md. 1997). The Court of Appeals of Maryland is
the highest state court in Maryland.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 669. The court further stated that "[wihile we agree that the jury could
have reasonably inferred that one of the deleted names belonged to Gray, that infer-
ence was not compelled." Id. at 668.
"' Id. at 668.
. Id. at 666-67. The Court stated that
[T]he better approach is that typified by the holding in United States v. Pende-
graph, [791 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1986)], where the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that 'a redacted confession may still violate the Bruton rule if
the statement compels a directly inculpating inference' between the redacted confession
and the nonconfessing defendant, 791 F.2d at 1465 (emphasis added) (where the word
'individual' was substituted for Pendegraph's name in his codefendant's confession, the
jury could infer that Pendegraph was that 'individual' if only because there was no other
possibility)....
Id. at 666 (emphasis in original).
'" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Gray
(No. 96-8653) (quoting State v. Gray, 687 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1997).
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Gray.12  Hence, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the
judgment of the lower court.
2 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'" to
answer the question expressly left open in Richardson and at is-
sue in Gray. 24 It sought to determine whether a "redaction that
replaces a defendant's name with an obvious indication of the
deletion, such as a blank space, the word 'deleted' or a similar
symbol, still falls within Bruton's protective rule."'
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,126 justice Breyer addressed whether
a redaction that substitutes a defendant's name with an obvious
symbol or deletion is admissible under the Bruton rule.127 The
Court held that substitutions for a defendant's name, such as a
symbol, obvious blank space, or the words "deleted" or "dele-
tion" in a codefendant's incriminating confession, create state-
ments that too similarly resemble the original confession.2 8
Justice Breyer concluded that these types of statements possess
no significant legal difference from their original counterparts
and that the application of the Bruton rule renders these specific
confessions inadmissible.'2
The Court first defined the Bruton rule.3 Justice Breyer
stated that "certain 'powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant'-those naming another defen-
dant-considered as a class, are so prejudicial that limiting in-
"' Gray, 687 A.2d at 669.
122 Id.
13 Gray v. Maryland, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997).
12 Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1155 (1998).
' Id. at 1155.
126 Id. at 1153. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburgjoined inJustice
Breyer's opinion.
'2 Id. at 1155.
128 id.
' Id. at 1156.
"" Id. at 1154-55.
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structions cannot work.""1 A codefendant's confession must
therefore be changed so as to eliminate any prejudice against
the nonconfessing defendant.32 The Court explained that re-
placing a defendant's name with an obvious symbol or deletion
is impermissible because the statement remains directly accusa-
tory, and thus, the jurors will understand that the confession
implicates the defendant.33
Second, the Court distinguished Gray from Richardson be-
cause the confession in Richardson made no reference to the
nonconfessing defendant, whereas Bell's confession directly im-
plicated Gray.13 4 The Court found that Bell's redacted confes-
sion functioned the same way grammatically as the original
version. 35 Unlike the confession in Richardson, Bell's redacted
confession pointed directly to Gray's existence by replacing his
name in an obvious manner.136
Third, the Court was able to reconcile Gray with the basic
premise of Richardson by distinguishing among the types of in-
ferences in a confession.3 7  The confession in Richardson was
only incriminating once linked with other evidence at trial.' In
Gray however, "It]he inferences at issue ... involve statements
that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, of-
ten obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a
jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confes-
sion the very first item introduced at trial.',
13 9
Justice Breyer acknowledged that Richardson allows into evi-
dence some inferentially incriminating statements, such as co-
defendants confessions that become incriminating when linked
"' Id. at 1155.
132 Id.
Id. at 1155-56.
"4Id. at 1155. In Richardson, "illiam's confession [did not violate Marsh's Sixth
Amendment rights because it] amounted to 'evidence requiring linkage' in that it
'became' incriminating in respect to Marsh 'only when linked with evidence intro-
duced later at trial'." Id. at 1154.
"' Id. at 1156.
16 "id.
117 Id. at 1156-57.




with other evidence at trial.140 Justice Breyer also recognized
that the jurors in Gray needed to make some degree of infer-
ence in order to link Gray to the words "deletion" and the blank
spaces on the paper. The mere fact that a confession requires
the jury to make some type or degree of inference in order to
link the codefendant to the confession, however, does not
automatically place it beyond the scope of Bruton's protective
rule by virtue of the holding in Richardson.42 For example, a
confession that utilizes a nickname or specific description of an
individual in lieu of a codefendant's name, which admittedly
requires some sort of an inference to link the codefendant to
the confession, still refers directly to the codefendant and is
therefore deemed facially incriminatory.4 4 The Court stated
that this type of change is transparent because it does not fool
the jurors, particularly when the defendant is sitting in the
courtroom before the jurors' very eyes. 44 If anything, an obvi-
ous deletion combined with cautionary jury instructions, may
very well call the jury's attention to the "deletions" or blanks.
Justice Breyer stated that "the judge's instruction not to con-
sider the confession as evidence against [the codefendant] ...
provide[s] an obvious reason for the blank.'
46
Fourth, the Court suggested that Bell's confession could
have been redacted in part so that it made no particular refer-
ence to Gray; therefore, it would not have been obvious that the
deletions referred to the codefendant in the courtroom, similar
to the confession in Richardson.47 For example, the answer read
into evidence to the question, "Who was in the group that beat




'4 Id. at 1156.
144 Id. at 1155.
4 Id. Justice Breyer explained that "b]y encouraging the jury to speculate about
the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confession's
accusation-once the jurors work out the reference." Id. at 1155-56.
" Id. at 1155.
14 Id. at 1157.
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guys," rather than, "Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other
guys." 8
Finally, the Court acknowledged that a redacted confession
containing blank spaces or the words "deleted" or "deletion" in
place of the codefendant's name is less incriminating than a
149confession that uses a codefendant's full name. It also ac-
cepted that in some situations, such as where there is more than
one codefendant, it may not even be clear as to which codefen-
dant a blank refers. 50 However, the Court still relegated the
type of redacted confessions that replace a codefendant's name
with a symbol, blank or the word "deleted" to an inadmissible
class of confessions covered by the Bruton principle because the
confession remains directly accusatory against the codefen-
dant. 5' This type of confession thereby has the same effect as if
no redaction has occurred at all.52 For these reasons, the Su-
preme Court determined that Bell's confession, which replaced
Gray's name with the words "deleted" or "deletion" or blank
spaces, was impermissible!"
B. JUSTICE SCALJA'S DISSENT
Writing for the dissent,5 Justice Scalia argued that the ma-
jority opinion extended the narrow exception of Bruton, as set
forth in Richardson, too far1 5 Justice Scalia first restated the ma-
jority's acknowledgement that Richardson placed inferentially in-
criminating statements outside the reach of the Bruton
principle.56 He next restated the majority's categorization of
confessions that redact a defendant's name with the use of a
symbol or blank space as inferentially incriminating.' 7 Justice
148 Id.




"s The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's
opinion.
"' Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1159 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 1159 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
117 Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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Scalia used these concessions by the majority to demonstrate
what he believed to be an inconsistency in the Court's logic.'58
He contended that the majority unduly extended the boundary
drawn in Richardson by placing an inferentially incriminating
confession under the protection of the Bruton principle.' 9
Justice Scalia emphasized the premise thatjurors follow lim-
iting instructions.'9 For example, the dissent found the intro-
duction of Bell's redacted confession indistinguishable from the
introduction at trial of evidence "of a defendant's prior convic-
tions for the purpose of sentencing enhancement, or statements
elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona for
the purpose of impeachment .... Justice Scalia believed that
the preceding examples demonstrated the legal system's de-
pendence and reliance on jurors to follow limiting instruc-
162
tions. So long as the jury is cautioned that such evidence may
not be used to determine a defendant's guilt, Justice Scalia ar-
gued, the introduction of a redacted confession or a defen-
dant's prior convictions or statements are permissible and do
not violate a defendant's constitutional guarantees.
6
1
Justice Scalia further disagreed with the majority's portrayal
of Bell's confession as directly accusatory of Gray.'64 The dissent
did not believe that Bell's confession was analogous to a confes-
sion which uses a specific description or nickname in lieu of a
codefendant's name, as the majority had asserted, because the
latter is facially incriminating whereas the former requires
speculation on behalf of the jury'rs For a confession to be fa-
cially incriminating, Justice Scalia argued, it must be "incrimi-
nating independent of other evidence introduced at trial."'66
58 Id. at 1159-60 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
9 Id. at 1160 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'o Id. at 1159 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
6 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
.62 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
161 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'" Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
165 Id. at 1159-60 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 1159 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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According to Justice Scalia, the statement "Me, deleted and de-
leted" taken at face value only implicated Bell.167
Justice Scalia believed the introduction of Bell's confession
did not enable the jury merely to look at Gray and definitively
know that the confession specifically incriminated him.1'8 Jus-
tice Scalia explained that although "the jury may speculate, the
statement expressly implicates no one but the speaker." 169 Fur-
ther evidence was required to link Bell's confession to Gray be-
cause the words "deleted" or "deletion" and blank spaces,
absent any extrinsic evidence, left uncertain to whom the dele-
tions referred. 170  Theoretically, the confession could have re-
ferred to Tank or one of the other six men involved in the
beating.171 If the confession had been read as "Me, Kevin Gray
and a few other guys" then it clearly would have incriminated
Gray. 172
Bell's confession, therefore, was properly admitted into evi-
dence, particularly when combined with the limiting instruc-
tions because "the issue . . . is not whether the confession
incriminated petitioner [inferentially], but whether the in-
crimination is so 'powerful' that we must depart from the nor-
mal presumption that the jury follows its instructions.' 173 Justice
Scalia argued that courts should only depart from the funda-
mental notion that jurors follow limiting instructions when a
confession is facially incriminang.'74 Justice Scalia explained
that limiting instructions sufficiently hinder jurors from going
6
7 Id. at 1159-60 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1159 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 1160 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'70 Id. at 1159-60 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1160 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'72 Id. at 1161 n.2. (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Interestingly, the defense did not object
to the question of whether he was able to arrest Gray based upon the confession,
which prosecutors posed to the detective after he read Bell's confession into evi-
dence. Gray was therefore deprived of the right to "complain of some incremental
indentifiability added to the redacted statement by the question and answer." Id. at
1161 n.2. (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The question posed to the detective and the detec-
tive's answer could possibly have been grounds for reversal if found to have inexora-
bly linked Gray to the confession. Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).




down the path of speculation in contextually incriminating
situations.175
Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority's proposed
redaction.176 If the confession had originally been "Me and
Kevin decided to beat Stacey," the majority proposed that the
statement should have been redacted to "I decided to beat Sta-
cey" which "would no longer be a confession to the conspiracy
charge, but rather the foundation for an insanity defense."
1 77
The dissent argued that the proper redaction was still "Me and
deleted" or "Me and another person.1 7 8 Justice Scalia con-
tended that "we have never before endorsed-and.., we ought
not to endorse-the redaction of a statement by some means
other than the deletion of certain words, with the fact of the de-
letion shown."1 79 If this form of redaction would unduly preju-
dice a codefendant, such as in the case of only two codefendants
where "Me and deleted" is more obvious, then the nonconfessor
may appeal to federal and state rules of criminal procedure
which provide for severance or the exclusion of the confes-
sion.' °
Justice Scalia rejected a bright-line rule which would render
inadmissible all redacted confessions that employ the words "de-
leted" or "deletion," blank spaces or a symbol in lieu of the co-
defendant's name.""1 The dissent believed a confession should
only be barred when it is facially incriminating, meaning that
the jury is compelled to link the codefendant to the incriminat-
ing statements independent of other evidence admitted at
trial.8 2 That ajury may infer that the statement refers to the co-
defendant is inconsequential because the trial judge's limiting
instructions adequately safeguard against the jurors linking the
confession to the codefendant.
1 3
, 5Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'76 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'7 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'78 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
"'Id. at 1160-61 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1159-61 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
"12 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).




This Note argues that the majority's decision to create a.
bright-line or per se rule which prohibits redacted confessions
that substitute a defendant's name with the word "deleted" or
an obvious symbol is the most appropriate solution.14 A bright-
line rule protects a defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantees of
confrontation and cross-examination by making out-of-court
confessions that directly accuse co-defendants inadmissible at
trial.
The majority in Gray believed that Bell's confession, albeit
redacted, still directly implicated Gray.' 85 The majority thereby
used the facially incriminating approach in determining that
even with the words "deleted" or "deletion" and blank spaces,
Bell's confession outwardly incriminated Gray.'86 By creating a
bright-line rule, the majority built an additional safeguard for
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights into the facially in-
criminating test.'87 The majority's rule ensures that thd specific
type of redaction at issue in Gray will automatically be rendered
inadmissible under the facially incriminating approach. ' 8 Much
like the emperor's new clothes, the words "deleted" and "dele-
tion" or blank spaces did not cloak Gray's name. The majority
recognized that, despite the use of the words "deleted" or "dele-
tion," the jury could understand that the confession referred
specifically to Gray.'8 9 The effect of Bell's redacted confession
was simply transparent. '
4 Id. See Ritter, supra note 60, at 916-17 (arguing "[f]ior cases in which anonymous
references to others remain after redaction, however, the fairest and most practical
solution is a per se rule prohibiting the introduction of the confession in that form").
19 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155.
' Id. at 1155-57.
,07 But see Garcia, supra note 7, at 437-38 (arguing instead that "severance is the
most effective means of affording a defendant a fair trial" because even the mere in-
troduction of a redacted confession undermines the basis of the Confrontation
Clause. A codefendant is forced to take the stand, thereby losing her "privilege
against self-incrimination in order to compensate for the denial of another constitu-
tional safeguard: her right to confront her accusers as stipulated in the Sixth
Amendment.").
188 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1157.




The dissent expressly embraced a pure facially incriminat-
ing approach just like the approach used in Richardson.'9' Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, a redacted confession should be
admissible unless the jury is forced to link the confession to the
nonconfessing codefendant.92 Further, a juror's ability to infer
that a confession refers to a codefendant is inconsequential be-
cause the trial judge's limiting instructions adequately safeguard
against this type of speculation.1
3
On the surface, the majority and dissenting opinions appear
diametrically opposed.9 4 In essence, however, the majority and
dissent agreed that the facially incriminating approach is the
appropriate standard by which to judge the admissibility of a
codefendant's incriminating confession. ' The dissent explicitly
announced its use of the facially incriminating approach,
9 6
while the majority implicitly used the facially incriminating
analysis in the sense that the majority found that Bell's redacted
confession directly accused Gray despite the deletions. 7 Admit-
tedly, the majority's analysis had an inferentially or contextually
incriminating component.'98 The majority's minor use of an in-
ferentially incriminating analysis is insignificant, however, be-
cause a pure division between the facially incriminating
,' Id. at 1161 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
"
2 Id. at 1160-61 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'"Id. at 1160 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).




'96 Id. at 1159 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
,97 Id. at 1155. See United States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 1082, 1086-87 (7th. Cir.
1998) (holding that codefendant's confession was admissible under Gray because the
statements only incriminated the other codefendants once linked with other evidence
at trial); Herrera v. United States, No. 97 Civ. 2570 (TPG), 93 Cr. 203 (TPG), 1998
WL 770559, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 3, 1998) (explaining that Gray only places facially in-
criminating statements under Bruton's protective rule); People v. Bryden, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 554, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the Gray court "concluded that no
Sixth Amendment right is invoked when other evidence must be associated with the
extrajudicial statement to implicate the defendant.").
I" Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155. The Court explained, however, that inference pure and
simple cannot make the critical difference, for if it did, then Richardson would also
place outside Bruton's scope confessions that use shortened first names, nicknames,
descriptions as unique as the "red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp," and




approach and the inferentially incriminating approach is im-
possible.' 0 Even in cases where there is an obvious link between
a confession and a nonconfessing codefendant, the jury must
still make some degree of inference no matter how minute.'00
The difference in opinion between the majority and dissent,
therefore, was not over the appropriateness of the facially in-
criminating analysis, but whether Bell's confession failed under
the facially incriminating analysis.20 1 The question thus became
whether Bell's confession compelled the jury to link his confes-
sion to Gray.202 The majority believed that the use of the word
"deleted" or "deletion" or an obvious symbol was directly accu-
satory, and therefore facially incriminating because the jurors
were compelled to link the confession to Gray.23 The dissent,
on the other hand, did not believe that the confession forced
the jurors to link the confession to Gray.00
While the dissent is technically correct in that Bell's confes-
sion could have referred to Gray, Tank or one of the other six
men involved in the beating,0 5 the majority reached a more sen-
sible conclusion. Despite the particular circumstances of Gray,
the majority's bright-line rule, which bars the use of the words
"deleted" or "deletion," is still favorable because it neither un-
duly prejudices Bell nor presents an untrue fiction to the jury.00
A redacted confession is only unduly prejudicial against the
confessor if the redaction makes it appear as if he alone com-
mitted the crime.0 7 The majority's proposed redaction in Gray
did not create the type of statement that would unduly preju-
dice Bell.208 The majority suggested that the answer read into
evidence to the question "Who was in the group that beat Sta-
"' Id. at 1157. More importantly, it is "the kind of, not the simple fact of, infer-




2 Id. at 1155.
" Id. at 1160 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).





cey?" should have been read as "Me and a few other guys" rather
than "Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys." 209 This state-
ment maintains the distribution of blame as detailed by the con-
fessor.1 If the statement were to simply read "Me" in response
to '"ho was in the group that beat Stacey?," then the statement
would be unduly prejudicial to Bell.2
Furthermore, the bright-line rule renders inadmissible re-
dacted confessions which replace a codefendant's name with a
symbol or the word "deleted." This is true even in cases where
the confession would not harm the codefendants, such as in a
case with multiple codefendants. Despite the fact that a per se
rule may be overly encompassing at times, the prosecution's
case is not harmed.21 3 The prosecution is still able to introduce
the pertinent part of the confession against the confessing de-
fendant once an appropriate redaction is used. 4 The majority,
in creating the bright-line rule, successfully ensured that the
prosecution could introduce the confession against the appro-
priate defendant, and that the confessor would not be unduly
prejudiced by the redaction, while at the same time protecting
the nonconfessing codefendant's constitutional guarantees.1
A major weakness of the dissent's logic is that evidence is
not introduced in a vacuum. What the jurors see in the court-
room may be as important and influential as what they hear at
trial. 6 In fact, the key premise of the majority opinion is that
what the jurors perceive in the courtroom may even override
the trial judge's limiting instructions.1 7 Take, for instance, a
situation in which the confession reads "I committed the crime









216 Id. at 1155.
217 Id. at 1155-56. See also Ritter, supra note 60, at 915 ("It is unrealistic to assume
that an instruction to jurors will prevent them from thinking about the identity of a
perpetrator whose actions are elaborately described in the confession.").
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fendants may be floating around the courtroom, if there is only
one other defendant in the courtroom, the natural inclination is
to assume that the X replaced that person's name."8 A juror
surely may wonder that if it weren't the codefendant's name
that was replaced with the X, then why would the name need to
be crossed out in the first place?219 Admittedly, it is not as ap-
parent which codefendant is expressly implicated by the confes-
sion if there are two or more codefendants in the courtroom.
However, the prosecution's case against the appropriate defen-
dant is equally as strong, and the confessing defendant is not
unduly prejudiced, if the confession is read as "I committed the
crime with another person" or "someone else" instead of the
proverbial "X.
221
Ultimately, the bright-line rule is very narrow, as it only ap-
plies in instances where a codefendant's name is replaced with
an obvious symbol or the words "deleted" or "deletion.2 22 The
test set forth by the Richardson Court is still the appropriate test
for all other types of redacted confessions. 2 s The threshold for
all redacted confessions remains higher than that the jury could
have made an inference linking the confession to the codefen-
dant, but rather that the jury was compelled to make this infer-
218 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155. But see Leading Cases, Confrontation Clause-Use of Code-
fendant's Confession in a Joint Trial: Gray v. Maryland, 112 HARv. L. RPEv. 142, 149
(1998) (asserting that "if an individual's very status as a criminal defendant were a
cognizable source of prejudice-literally every conviction would be suspect ....
[T]his route of inference ... would require a presumption that jurors will not obey
the presumption of innocence that is central to any criminal trial.") [hereinafter
Leading Cases].
219 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155-56. See Commonwealth v. McGlone, 716 A.2d 1280, 1286
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating that the "use of the term 'deleted' or 'X' immediately
signals jurors that a specific person was named by the declarant and they, the jurors,
are not permitted to know that name.").
= Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1156-57.
221 Id. at 1157.
2'' Id. But see Leading Cases, supra note 218, at 150-51 (arguing that the majority's
bright-line rule is fundamentally over-reaching in that it ignores the "presumption of
juror fidelity"; rather, the appropriate solution would be to "aggressively police the
use of redacted confessions to ensure that prosecutors do not undermine the limiting
instruction required by Richardson.").
=3 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1157.
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ence. 4 Redacted confessions that replace a defendant's name
with "deleted" or an obvious symbol are automatically assumed
to force the jury to link the confession to the codefendant.
225
This is proper in order to preserve a defendant's Constitutional
guarantees as well as ensure administrative ease.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Gray v. Maryland, the Court held that substitutions for a
defendant's name, such as a symbol, obvious blank space, or the
words "deleted" or "deletion," in a codefendant's incriminating
confession, create statements that too similarly resemble the
original confession. 6 Hence, these redacted confessions have
virtually the same legal consequence as the unredacted versions
and are rendered inadmissible hearsay under Bruton's protective
rule.227
The majority created a bright-line or per se rule which bars
the admission of these types of confessions, regardless of the
particular facts of the case.28 The per se rule set forth by the ma-
jority has many advantages and virtually no apparent disadvan-
tages. First, a bright-line rule is easy to apply and eliminates
confusion among the lower courts.2  Second, the benefits of a
2' Id. at 1155-56. See Commonwealth v. Blake, 696 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Mass. 1998)
(stating that a codefendant's confession which only becomes directly accusatory once
linked with other evidence at trial "generally does not offend the Sixth Amendment,
so long as an adequate limiting instruction is given").
Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155.
226 Id. at 1157.
2, Id. at 1156-57.
'Id.
"' Courts are able to apply the Gray bright-line rule fairly easily. See, e.g., United
States v. Peterson, 140 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the substitution of a
codefendant's name with "person X" was impermissible under Gray); United States v.
Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that confession which redacted
codefendants' names "with a marker, are exactly the type of evidence found unconsti-
tutional in Gray."); People v. Bryden, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
("Simply excising the name of the defendant from the extrajudicial statements is in-
sufficient when it remains obvious that the substituted words refer to the defen-
dant."); United States v. Cambrelen, 18 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that confession which redacted codefendants' names with "guy" or "guys"
and was retyped with no blank spaces was admissible under Gray); Commonwealth v.
McGlone, 716 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (redacted confession admissible
under Gray because "[n]owhere in the redacted statement are there overt indications
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joint trial are still realized despite the prohibition on the words
"deleted" or "deletion" and obvious symbols in lieu of a code-
fendant's name. Administrative conveniences resulting from a
joint trial include saving money, time, and resources.2 0 Third,
although the prosecution's creative license is somewhat re-
stricted, it is still able to present the pertinent part of the con-
fession against the appropriate defendant. Most importantly,
this per se rule protects, if not enforces, a defendant's Sixth
Amendment guarantees of confrontation and cross-
examination, which ensures the reliability or credibility of evi-
dence against her.
Gabrielle Benadi
of revision," where there were no blank spaces and codefendant's name was replaced
with "other people").
See generally Kevin P. Hein,Joinder and Severance, 30 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 1139, 1154-
1163 (1993) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of joint trials for the state
and codefendants). But see, e.g., Ritter, supra note 60, at 921 (arguing that the com-
monly stated advantages ofjoint trials may be exaggerated).
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